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UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CROWDED:
BROWN V. PLATA AND HOW THE SUPREME
COURT PUSHED BACK TO KEEP PRISON
REFORM LITIGATION ALIVE
Alicia Bower*
In its May 2011 Brown v. Plata decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a remedial order that required the potential release of a
shockingly large number of California prison inmates. The Court found
that, because of overcrowding in its prisons, California had failed to
provide adequate health care to its prisoners—a failure that constituted
a systemwide violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. In order to reach its ultimate result, however, the
Court had to confront the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a
statute that Congress had enacted to combat precisely the type of prison
reform litigation that Plata embodied. In the end, the Court found its
way through the PLRA’s requirements and, in the process, reinforced a
strong judicial prerogative to fashion remedies, which now more clearly
includes the rare structural injunction.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., English, May 2007,
University of California, Los Angeles. I owe a huge amount of gratitude to the editors and staff
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review—and in particular Elliot Gonzalez, Blythe
Golay, and Joshua Rich—for the time and effort that they dedicated to making this Comment as
close to perfect as possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California’s struggle with its overcrowded prisons is not a new
battle.1 But now, the overcrowding is officially unconstitutional.2 In
its May 2011 decision in Brown v. Plata,3 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that overcrowding in California’s prisons creates a systemwide
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.4 The Court determined that, primarily as a
result of overcrowded conditions, California has failed to provide
adequate and timely medical care to its inmates.5 The individual
cases of deficient medical treatment are appalling. In writing for the
majority of a divided Court,6 Justice Kennedy described suicidal
patients being held in “telephone-booth sized cages without toilets”
for prolonged periods of time because there was simply no other
place to hold them.7 One correctional officer testified that as many as
fifty sick prisoners could be held in a twelve-by-twenty-foot cage for
up to five hours while they waited for medical treatment.8 One report
found wait times for mental health care as high as twelve months.9
Another analysis estimated sixty-eight preventable or possibly
1. See Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cal. Governor, Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency
Proclamation (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278; Alison Stateman,
California’s Prison Crisis: Be Very Afraid, TIME (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1916427,00.html; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–24 (2011)
(“The degree of overcrowding in California’s prisons is exceptional. California’s prisons are
designed to house a population just under 80,000, but . . . the population was almost double that.
The State’s prisons had operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years.
Prisoners are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house inmates.”).
2. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922–23.
3. 131 S. Ct. 1910.
4. See id. at 1922.
5. Id. at 1923.
6. The Court was split 5-4. Id. at 1921. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion
with Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joining. Id. Justice
Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Id.; see also Adam Liptak,
Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at A1
(“Justice Scalia summarized his dissent, which was pungent and combative, from the bench. Oral
dissents are rare; this was the second of the term.”). Justice Alito also filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1921.
7. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1924 (“A psychiatric expert reported observing an inmate who had
been held in such a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive
and nearly catatonic. Prison officials explained they had ‘no place to put him.’”).
8. Id. at 1925.
9. Id. at 1924.

Winter 2012]

BROWN V. PLATA

557

preventable deaths in a one-year period.10 In other words, this report
found that a preventable death occurred every six to seven days in
the California prison system due to deficiencies in medical
treatment.11
While the specific conditions and individual cases of inadequate
treatment that were highlighted in Plata are shocking, the remedy
that the Court ultimately upheld to cure the constitutional violations
appears shocking in its own right: an order requiring California to
reduce its prison population, which could mean the release of tens of
thousands of inmates within the next two years.12 The release order
called for a rare structural injunction, a drastic and complex remedy
that is aimed at curing constitutional violations by institutions.13
Despite the Court’s deep divide over the proper outcome of the case,
the Justices all agreed on the exceptional gravity of the remedy.14
The extent of the injunction that the Court ordered in Plata
potentially exceeds any remedial order that the Court has ever issued.
10. Id. at 1925 n.4.
11. Id. at 1927 (“[I]t is an uncontested fact that, on average, an inmate in one of California’s
prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days due to constitutional deficiencies in the [California
prisons’] medical delivery system.” (alterations in original) (discussing the lower court’s
findings)).
12. Id. at 1928. The Court noted that the lower court estimated that the required population
reduction could be as high as 46,000 persons. Id. at 1923. The Court also noted that, since the
time that the appeal process began, the state made a reduction of 9,000 persons. Id. Taking this
reduction into account, the Court concluded that “a further reduction of 37,000 persons could be
required.” Id.
13. See generally Karla Grossenbacher, Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting a
Remedy When Local Officials Resist, 80 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2232 (1992) (“The impact of structural
litigation reverberates beyond the named individuals or parties involved. Structural litigation can
affect entire communities by reallocating social resources and implicating social policy.”); The
Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 314 (2000) [hereinafter
Leading Cases] (“Structural reform litigation is best understood when contrasted with
conventional adjudication between two individuals in a dispute: in structural reform litigation a
judge seeks not to redress a particular injury, but to transform large organizational structures,
such as schools or prisons. Accordingly, the remedy is an affirmative, extensive injunction—a
command to act, rather than to cease some conduct. The injunction applies to an institution
governing and composed of many individuals and requires continued, often long-term, judicial
supervision.”).
14. Justice Kennedy acknowledged from the outset of his majority opinion that the
population reduction that the Court’s decision potentially required was of “unprecedented sweep
and extent.” Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. Justice Scalia expressed a similar reaction in his dissent, in
which he declared the ordered remedy to be “perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court
in our Nation’s history . . . .” Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Likewise, in his dissent, Justice
Alito talked of the “radical reduction” that the Court’s order required and the “radical nature” of
the Court’s chosen remedy. Id. at 1959–60 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Part II of this Comment provides a basic outline of the facts that
led to the Court’s decision. Part III presents the majority’s reasoning
and the opposing arguments and reasoning of Justice Scalia’s dissent.
Then, Part IV analyzes the impact and significance of the Court’s
holding. Specifically, this Comment discusses how, despite a federal
statute’s intended restrictions on prison reform litigation, and more
specifically on the judiciary’s ability to issue structural injunctions in
prison condition cases, Plata not only affirmed the Court’s ability to
issue a structural injunction in the prison reform context but may
have actually expanded the general scope of the remedy itself.
II. STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
In Plata, the Court addressed the seriously deficient mental and
medical treatment that California’s prison population receives.15 The
case came to the Court as a consolidated matter that combined two
separate class action suits filed by California prisoners.16 The first
case, Coleman v. Wilson,17 was brought in 1990 by California
inmates who suffered from serious mental disorders.18 The second,
Plata v. Schwarzenegger,19 was brought in 2001 by California
inmates who had serious medical conditions.20 In both cases, the
prisoners claimed that the state’s inadequate treatment of their health
conditions violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.21 Ultimately, the district courts in both cases
agreed with the petitioners, finding that the California prison
system’s inadequate treatment of the inmates violated the Eighth
Amendment.22
After years of litigation, however, the judges in both cases found
that any remedy short of an ordered reduction in the prison
population would be ineffective in curing the constitutional

15. Id. at 1922 (majority opinion).
16. Id.
17. 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
18. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *12 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 4, 2009).
19. No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
20. Id. at *1.
21. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922–23.
22. Id. at 1947.
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violations.23 Eventually, both judges independently requested that a
three-judge panel be convened in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a).24 This section reserves the power to enter a prison release
order to a three-judge district court, as opposed to a single-judge
district court.25 And, because the judges in both cases believed that a
prison release order was necessary to remedy the constitutional
violations, both judges independently ordered that a three-judge
court be convened.26 Then, because the cases had such similar
subject matter and because the judges made similar requests for a
three-judge court, the cases were consolidated.27 The panel that
ultimately heard the consolidated matter consisted of the district
court judges from both cases and a judge from the Ninth Circuit.28
The three-judge court did in fact issue a prison release order that
required California to reduce overcrowding in its prisons by bringing
the prison population within 137 percent of the facilities’ designed
capacities.29 The three-judge court found that “until the problem of
overcrowding is overcome it will be impossible to provide
constitutionally compliant care to California’s prison population.”30
While the order left room for state officials to determine how the
reduction would occur, the court predicted that California would
ultimately need to release some prisoners before they had served
their full sentences.31 By the three-judge court’s estimate, the number
of prisoners requiring release could have been as high as 46,000.32
23. Id. at 1922.
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (2006) (“In any civil action in Federal court with respect to
prison conditions, a prison release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court . . . .”);
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922 (“The authority to order release of prisoners as a remedy to cure a
systemic violation of the Eighth Amendment is a power reserved to a three-judge district court,
not a single-judge district court.”).
26. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1923.
30. Id. at 1932.
31. Id. at 1923. The Court explained that the order required that the release of prisoners
occur “absent compliance through new construction, out-of-state transfers, or other means—or
modification of the order upon a further showing by the State . . . .” Id. However, the Court later
rejected new prison construction and out-of-state transfers as possible alternative ways to cure the
constitutional violations, citing the state’s dire fiscal condition and failed attempts to reduce
overcrowding in the past. Id. at 1937–38; see infra Part III.A.1.
32. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue seemed simple
enough: Was a remedial order that a lower three-judge court issued
“consistent with requirements and procedures set forth in a
congressional statute”?33 The statute at issue was the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which restricts the
circumstances in which a court can issue an order that reduces or
limits a prison population.34 The Court separated the issue into three
major components of analysis, each relating to a distinct requirement
that the PLRA outlined: (1) whether the lower court found by clear
and convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of the
violation of a Federal right”; (2) whether the lower court found by
clear and convincing evidence that “no other relief [would] remedy
the violation of the Federal right”; and (3) whether the relief
“extend[ed] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.”35 Finding that the
three-judge court’s ruling did in fact meet these requirements, the
Court upheld the prison release order, thereby requiring California to
reduce its prison population.36
III. REASONING
OF THE COURT
While it recognized the “unprecedented sweep and extent” of
the remedial order that it upheld in Plata, the Court also stressed the
similarly unprecedented severity of the constitutional violations.37
The Court stressed that the violations persisted for years and
remained uncorrected.38 In finding that the three-judge court’s ruling
met the requirements for a release order under the PLRA, the Court
relied heavily both on California’s long, failed history to correct the
violations and on a finding that there was no realistic likelihood of
future corrections.39 Moreover, the Court emphasized that because
the constitutional violations were systemwide, the only appropriate

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1922.
Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 310.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1), (3)(e) (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1922.
See id. at 1937–38.
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relief was one that was systemwide in nature.40 It was this
systemwide focus that ultimately served as a basis of the resulting
structural injunction in the case. Further, it was precisely this
systemwide approach that Justice Scalia took issue with in his
dissent.41 In opposing the majority’s systemwide approach, Justice
Scalia argued that the reform order “violates the terms of the
governing statute, ignores bedrock limitations on the power of
Article III judges, and takes federal courts wildly beyond their
institutional capacity.”42
A. The Majority’s Focus:
Past Failures, Unrealistic Alternatives for
the Future, and the Need for Systemwide Relief
1. No Other Relief
The Court in Plata held that the lower three-judge court did not
err when it found that “no other relief will remedy the violation of
the Federal right.”43 While the state presented three alternative
theories of “other relief” to remedy the constitutional violations, the
Court rejected all three.44 The three proposed remedies were (1) outof-state transfers of prisoners; (2) new construction of prisons; and
(3) additional hiring of medical personnel.45 In rejecting each of
these alternatives, the Court drew a distinction between realistic
alternatives and theoretical alternatives, clarifying that the former
would be sufficient while the latter would not.46 While the Court
found that each of the alternatives would be effective in theory, they
were not realistic “other relief,” either standing alone or in
combination.47
The Court determined that the alternatives were unrealistic for
two principle reasons: (1) California failed to effectuate them in the
past; and (2) the state could not afford to effectuate them in the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 1940–41.
Id. at 1952 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1951.
Id. at 1937 (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii) (2006)).
Id. at 1937–38.
Id. at 1937.
See id. at 1937–38.
Id. at 1939.
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future.48 Specifically, regarding the alternative of transferring
prisoners out of state, the Court found that, because the state had not
made any plans to execute this alternative, it was unrealistic to
expect that transfers would remedy the violations.49 The Court
further reasoned that even if the state had made such plans, it failed
to show that it had either the resources or the capacity to carry out
the plans.50 Similarly, the Court found that the construction of new
prisons was an unrealistic form of “other relief” due to the state’s
budget shortfalls.51 Finally, the Court found that hiring additional
medical personnel would not qualify as “other relief” that “will
remedy the violation of the federal right” because the state had been
unable to fill vacant positions for years and the Court found no
reason to expect any change in the future.52 While the Court
acknowledged that there had been some gains in staffing numbers,
the Court reasoned that filling all of the vacant positions was
unlikely due to the violent conditions and insufficient space that
overcrowding had caused at the prisons.53
In the end, despite the state’s proposed list of theoretically sound
remedial measures, the test for the Court was not what could work
but what would work. Ultimately, the Court found that the
alternatives that the state presented did not meet that standard. Even
more so, the Court rejected the proposition that a combined
approach, where all of the alternatives were executed together, would
be acceptable.54 For the Court, the state had simply waited too long
to effectively respond to the ongoing constitutional violations.55 The
state’s long history of failed remedial orders and the substantial
evidence of the “deleterious effects” of the overcrowded conditions
made even a combined-effort approach unacceptable.56

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 1938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1939.
See id.
Id.
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2. Narrowly Tailored
The Court in Plata found that, as the PLRA requires, the release
order that the lower three-judge court issued was narrowly drawn,
extended no further than necessary to correct the violations of a
federal right, and was the least intrusive means necessary to correct
the violations.57 In explaining these provisions of the PLRA that
require that a prison release order be narrowly tailored and in
clarifying what these provisions meant for the Court’s analysis, the
majority wrote, “This means only that the scope of the order must be
determined with reference to the constitutional violations established
by the specific plaintiffs before the court.”58 The Court also clarified
what it was not doing: “This case is unlike cases where courts have
impermissibly reached out to control the treatment of [prisoners] or
institutions beyond the scope of the violation.”59 Ultimately, the
Court rejected the state’s argument that the order was too broad
simply because the resulting remedy might have positive collateral
effects on other prisoners.60 The Court reasoned that the order to
reduce the California prison population, which would affect both
present and future inmates, was necessary because any order that
only targeted present inmates would not protect “future plaintiffs”—
i.e., inmates who might need health care in the future but who would
be denied such care due to continued overcrowding.61
Moreover, the Court reasoned that while the release order
applied to California’s entire prison system rather than to individual
institutions, it was narrowly tailored because in fact the entire system
was deficient.62 The Court pointed to the facts that the Coleman court
found systemwide violations and the Plata v. Schwarzenegger court
stipulated to systemwide relief.63 Therefore, the release order
appropriately focused on the entire California prison system and was
narrowly tailored.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id. at 1941.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1940.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Dissent’s Focus:
A Strictly Drawn Statute and
Traditional Constitutional Limitations
In his dissent, Justice Scalia found that the constitutional
violations that were presented in Plata did not justify an “intrusion
into the realm of prison administration.”64 Justice Scalia argued that
the Court’s holding extended Article III courts beyond their
capacity.65 He reasoned that, rather than address the injuries of any
particular plaintiff, the injunction attempted to “remedy . . . the
running of a prison system with inadequate medical facilities.”66
Justice Scalia pointed to the fact that it was not the entire prison
population that was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but
only certain individuals.67 He also drew the distinction that, rather
than provide for the “decent” operation of various institutions, the
Court should forbid the “indecent” treatment of individuals.68
Additionally, Justice Scalia emphasized a concern for California
residents by citing the release of inmates who have spent time
“develop[ing] intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison
gym.”69
IV. PUSHING BACK ON THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
The Court’s decision in Plata accomplished precisely what
Congress had attempted to prevent with its enactment of the PLRA.70
64. Id. at 1928–29; see id. at 1953 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Even if I accepted the
implausible premise that the plaintiffs have established a systemwide violation of the Eighth
Amendment, I would dissent from the Court’s endorsement of a decrowding order.”).
65. Id. at 1951.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1951–52.
68. See id. at 1951.
69. Id. at 1953; Steven E.F. Brown, California Controller Chiang Blasts Prison
Department’s Waste of Money, BIZJOURNALS.COM (July 21, 2011, 8:51 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2011/07/21/california-controller-blasts-prison.html
(“An inmate who served time at Avenal State Prison in the desert off Interstate 5 near the
Kettleman City exit recently laughed when told of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s
complaint in Brown v. Plata earlier this year. Scalia, in an oral dissent, said prisoners ‘developed
intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.’ The former inmate said the prison did
have a gym, but that it was filled with triple tier bunk beds.” (quoting Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1953
(Scalia, J., dissenting))).
70. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550,
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A central goal of the 1996 statute was to put an end to structural
reform litigation in cases that deal with deficient prison conditions.71
The PLRA served as a signal of congressional apprehension toward
court involvement in the management and restructuring of prisons in
particular.72 By enacting the PLRA, Congress set high standards for
prospective relief in cases where prison conditions are challenged73
and essentially created a “presumption that injunctions in the prison
context are constitutionally suspect.”74 It worked. Reform orders
relating to prison conditions decreased dramatically after the passage
of the PLRA, and existing orders became increasingly difficult to
enforce.75 The PLRA’s congressional check on the judiciary
appeared to be successful.
The majority in Plata, however, refused to fall in line with this
attempted shift in the balance of powers. Instead, the Court firmly
reasserted its judicial prerogative to fashion remedies that it deemed
necessary.76 The Court also rejected the idea that Congress could
legislate certain realms beyond judicial reach.77 According to the
554 (2006) (“The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) made old correctional court orders
harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to sustain and new ones harder to obtain.”).
71. See Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 318.
72. See id. at 310, 315. Justice Alito’s dissent expressed a similar sentiment that prisons
deserve special treatment. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Decisions regarding
state prisons have profound public safety and financial implications . . . .”). Justice Scalia echoed
that concern in his dissent. Id. at 1955 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“My general concerns associated
with judges’ running social institutions are magnified when they run prison systems, and doubly
magnified when they force prison officials to release convicted criminals.”).
73. See Schlanger, supra note 70, at 590–95 (discussing four principal provisions of the
PLRA that made existing reform orders harder to sustain and new orders harder to obtain: (1)
immediate termination; (2) automatic stay; (3) administrative exhaustion; and (4) attorneys’ fees
limitations). Interestingly, Schlanger argued that while the PLRA’s provision limiting prospective
relief seemed likely to cause a decline in reform orders, in practice, the provision would not cause
such a decline—a foreshadowing that proved true in Plata, where the Court jumped these hurdles.
Id. at 594.
74. Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 318 (pointing to the automatic stay provision of the
PLRA).
75. Schlanger, supra note 70, at 554 (“The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) made old
correctional court orders harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to sustain and new ones harder to
obtain . . . . [T]he 1996 congressional intervention of the PLRA significantly constrained
correctional court-order practice.”).
76. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929.
77. Id. at 1937. See Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 310, for an argument that the PLRA
did not interfere with the judicial prerogative; rather, it was an attempt to restore the “state of
affairs envisioned by traditional separation of powers principles” because “the goals and methods
of structural reform litigation encourage judicial legislation and undermine the traditional concept
of the separation of powers.”

566

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:555

majority, while courts must be “sensitive” to state interests and the
difficulties that are implicated in prison management and reform,
courts still must not “shrink from their obligation” to enforce
constitutional rights.78 More importantly, according to the majority,
this obligation creates judicial authority to fashion remedies even if a
remedy requires “[i]ntrusion into the realm of prison
administration.”79 The Court explained that an “intrusion into the
realm of . . . administration” is appropriate where there are
constitutional violations that (1) are “complex and intractable”; and
(2) have persisted for a substantial period of time and remain
uncorrected.80 When these circumstances are present, a court may
fashion a “practical remed[y]” that may include systematic changes
to shape and control an administration.81 Using these principles as a
guide for its decision, the Plata Court affirmed the structural
injunction as a remedy that courts can use when governments have
failed to cure constitutional violations, even if a congressional statute
attempts otherwise.
Furthermore, the Court may have done more than just affirm the
structural injunction as an available remedy; it may have actually
expanded the scope of the remedy itself. The majority shifted the
focus from the injuries of the plaintiffs, namely those with mental
and medical injuries, to the California prison system as a whole.82
Rather than assessing the violations that individual prisoners, or even
individual institutions, suffered, the Court instead affirmed an order
that targeted the constitutional deficiencies of the entire California
prison system.83 It was that whole system that was in violation of the
Constitution due to overcrowding in its prisons.84 In the end, the
Court expanded the interested group to include not only those who
are currently experiencing or who have experienced violations but
78. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (“Courts must be sensitive to the State’s interest in
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and
expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers
of convicted criminals. Courts nevertheless must not shrink from their obligation to ‘enforce the
constitutional rights of all “persons,” including prisoners.’” (citations omitted)).
79. Id. at 1928–29.
80. See id. at 1929–30.
81. Id. at 1937.
82. Id. at 1940.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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also to those who might experience violations.85 This shift suggests
that, rather than focus on actual violations, the Court tried to provide
for a better prison system as a whole. However, this shift invokes
issues of standing and the actual injury requirement; the Court has
specifically denied relief where the claim depended on the
petitioners’ ability to show actual widespread injury rather than
isolated instances of actual injury.86
V. CONCLUSION
With Brown v. Plata, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld perhaps
the most extreme remedial order that it has ever issued. The
structural injunction that the Court upheld called for the early release
of a shockingly large number of California inmates. Beyond the
practical implications of the order, the Court in Plata clearly signaled
that structural injunctions in prison reform litigation remain a valid
exercise of judicial power. Even more, the Court may have signaled
an expansion of the scope of the structural injunction remedy by
focusing on the potential, rather than the actual, constitutional
deficiencies in the California prison system. The Court reached its
ultimate conclusion, moreover, despite a congressional statute that
was aimed at preventing precisely this type of judicial decisionmaking in this context; the Court ultimately pushed back on the
PLRA in an effort to reaffirm its own broad equitable powers. With
the Court’s position clear, a new question arises: Will Congress now
decide to push back on Brown v. Plata?

85. Id.
86. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–52 (1996); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–
52 (1984).
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